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3Abstract
We analyze the European Welfare State according to a theoretical 
framawork based on four main social goals – stability, inequality, 
need, safety (SINS) – which the market mechanism fail to achieve: 
they are the market’s SINS. We propose a theoretical framework 
which is based on the distinction between “private goods”, which 
are the domain of the market, and “common goods”, which are the 
the domain of the Welfare State and the other lower layers of social 
institutions. The main result is that a high level of social protection 
benefits, properly allocated to these goals, can be effective  for 
achieving economic goals, because it allows to amend  market’s 
shortcoming for SINS, while allowing the flexibility for complying 
with the public budget constraint, given the positive relationship 
between GDP per-capita and the share of social protection benefits.  
A cross-section analysis shows that the goals of SINS are better 
achieved when the social protection benefit focuses on the func-
tions of family and children and sickness and health care, because 
they are the most poverty reduction: they allow to better achieve 
the goal of reducing inequality and providing families needs. We 
show that for the families with children the better working ar-
rangement – which is associated with higher GDP per-capita and 
lower inequality – is one parent working full time and one parent 
part-time. We explain the cross-section variability for the functions 
of pensions, housing and social exclusions in relationship with the 
goals of stability and and safety.  We analysis a sample of seven 
major European countries for the period 1995-2009, focusing on 
the goal of economic stability and the degree of procyciclical or 
countercyclical relationship between social protection expenditures 
and GDP per-capita. A number of econometric and numerical re-
sults are derived:  countries with better economic performances can 
have both procyclical and countercyclical behavior, but they have 
in common higher value of social protection benefits on the onset 
of the cyclical downturn or recession: the flexibility for budget ad-
justment come from the political leeway of the high starting value 
of social protection and the higher share of in-kind benefits. The 
4GDP per-capita in the year 2000 is a good predictor of the average 
primary balances for the European countries over the decade. 
JEL: H34, H53, H62, I38 
Key words: Welfare State, household income, poverty reduction, 
economic recession, government budget 
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Introduction ∗ 
 
We argue that Welfare State is a necessary condition for economic 
development  because it can amend the market mechanism for its 
shortcomings: in this paper we focus mainly on the issues of eco-
nomic Stability, the consequences of extreme Inequality, the miss-
ing care for citizens’  basic Needs, the lack of a Safety net and, 
notably, of food Security. These issues, which can be aptly named 
with the acronym SINS, address social goals that the market me-
chanism cannot cope with the price system as instrument, because 
they are not “private goods”, but rather “common goods”. The Eu-
ropean Welfare State has evolved, during the XX century, as a so-
cial response to the market’s SINS, especially since the Great De-
pression, and other developed countries, like the United States, are 
following suit, while big emerged countries, like China, start to 
struggle with the same problems. The evolution of the European 
Welfare State in a big chunk of the GDP has created new problems 
for the decision processes of the policy maker, prompting new lay-
ers of decision, while valuing the central role of institutions like the 
family and self-organized entities with social purposes. Most of the 
Welfare benefits should be entitlements rather than the outcome of 
political choice and political centralization should give way to a 
“grass root” decentralization, especially focusing families and 
children, and subsidiarity: because people “know better” and can 
provide the right incentives to the providers. The motivation for 
this paper is to suggest the framework of a theory which, taking 
stock of the European experience, can provide empirical evidences 
to support it. We propose a model where total household consump-
tion is made up of private consumption and social consumption: 
private consumption is a function of disposable income, which in-
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6cludes public income benefits, while social consumption is a func-
tion of GDP per-capita and the political process entailed by the 
economic growth. The size of the Welfare State derives from the 
demand of “common goods” to amend market’s SINS, given the 
stage of economic growth and the  constrain of the public budget.  
The allocation of the available resources depends on the political 
process and is crucial for its efficiency, measured in term of pover-
ty and inequality reduction. We measure stability, and uncertainty 
reduction, with the pattern of countercyclical or procyclical beha-
vior for a selection of 7 major European countries, relating it to 
dynamic of total and private government balances and showing the 
relevance of in-kind transfers in providing discretionary spending 
over the business cycle or recession. 
1. Welfare State and market’s SINS 
The modern Welfare State is an evolving institution, prompted by 
missing market and market shortcomings and shaped by continous 
economic and technical changes, which require the support of mar-
ket’s SINS amendments. We better define SINS: 
a) Stability is central to the process of economic growth, as we 
harshly learnt during the Great Depression and we experience 
since the onset of the Great Recession in 2007. Serious lack of 
stability produce uncertainty, in the Keynesian (or some would 
suggest Knightian) sense: as Keynes put it there is no scientific 
basis to measure the probability of the “prospect of a European 
war … or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty 
years hence” (Keynes, 1937). We suggest however that also a 
different kind of uncertainty is relevant, namely the impossibil-
ity of thinking to all the states of the world, which make un-
thinkable states the origin of a structural uncertainty, because 
everyone cannot even think of it. To be concrete, Greek crisis 
is the origin of Euro crisis because it made thinkable the un-
thinkable, starting the betting game on Euro break-up. When 
faced with the fear of these two kind of uncertainty households 
7reduce their spending and firms postpone their investments. 
We can try to detect whether the Welfare State sustains eco-
nomic Stability looking to the counter-cyclical pattern of social 
spending: unemployment insurance is a case in point, together 
with the level of family income and the presence of one or two 
income earners.  
b) Inequality, if becomes too high or extreme, can be the cause of 
poverty and hardship for families with low purchasing power 
and economic crisis for firms  with oversupply of production. 
In the US the underlying force driving extreme inequality was 
the skyrocketing rewards to the people working in the financial 
sector, with a sharp increase in risk and uncertainty, but with-
out an adequate safety net (Rajan, 2010). The Great Recession 
stems from different causes in comparison with the Great De-
pression, but the two crisis share a peak of extreme inequality 
as a common onset.  A well-crafted Welfare State can therefore 
speed-up the escape from the crisis by reducing poverty and 
the imbalances between supply and demand and  some Euro-
pean countries seem to achieve just that. 
c) Needs are the basic incentive for labor supply and a well-
functioning family is the only institution where – oddly – the 
marxist dictum “from each according to his ability, to each ac-
cording to his needs” (Marx, 1875) can seemingly work. The 
family can solve the trade-off between equity and efficiency or, 
to put it in a different social perspective, family merits and 
needs, because in a well-functioning family merits and needs 
coexist and family income is shared according to the needs  
(Campiglio, 2011): the fundamental reason was neatly pointed 
out by Ken Arrow (1951), arguing that households’ decision 
process could be thought as the elementary social choice, pro-
ducing rational decisions when based on “common standards 
of value”, which is also the basis of a well-functioning family. 
The complementarity of merits and needs within the family is 
evident in the case of the children, who do not contribute to the 
family income but receive resources accordind to their needs. 
When the family income is low or inadequate, the contribution 
8of the Welfare State becomes crucial and responsability be-
comes the link between Welfare and fairness (Fleurbaey, 
2008): children should be recognized as a “commons”, being 
rivalrous (their parents take care of them) but generating non-
excludable benefits to all the society. The issue of children, as 
future citizens without voice in modern democracies, is behind 
the question “Who’s minding the Kids?” (Curie, 2006), which  
John Stuart Mill already answered in 1859.1 The problem is 
that in modern democracies children do not have a real politi-
cal weight, because of the unspoken political rule “no-voice-
no-representation”: recent economic literature proves that giv-
ing “voice” to the minorites can change the resource allocation, 
and still more profound transformations have been carried for-
ward in women life since their franchise,  as it could happen 
with the children, future citizens (Campiglio, 2005, 2009). 
d) Safety and Security cover a wide range of economic and social 
issues, which the market mechanism cannot address. Firstly, 
the lack of Safety and Security reminds how tight is the rela-
tionship between crime and deviance, well functioning social 
organization and institutions, well-being and economic devel-
opment2. An efficient Welfare State can provide care and pre-
vention, supporting families and the communities, improving 
welfare and reducing the huge social and economic cost of 
crime and social deviance. On the economic side, the market 
mechanism cannot cope, as it would be necessary, with the 
problems of extreme poverty and the deep social consequences 
of the lack of economic Safety and Security. Perhaps this is 
                                                     
1 John Stuart Mill writes that “Rulers and ruling classes are under a neces-
sity of considering the interests and wishes of those who have the suf-
frage; but of those who are excluded, it is in their option whether they will 
do so or not; and however honestly disposed, they are in general too fully 
occupied with things which they must attend to, to have much room in 
their thoughts for anything which they can with impunity disregard”. (ital-
ics in the original). 
2 The Routledge Handbook of Deviant Behavior (2011), edited by Clifton 
Bryant. 
9why in the U.S., instead of talking about Welfare State,  it is 
preferred the term Safety net, which captures better the idea 
that the State should protect people against bad luck or adverse 
economic shocks. However the Safety net in the U.S. has 
proved  to be a weak protection in face of a sharp and lasting 
increase of long-term unemployment, the highest recorded 
since World War II (Rajan, 2010). While health care insurance 
is easily spotted as the weak link in the U.S. Safety net, there 
are social programs which should be considered in European 
Welfare sistem: the Earned Tax Income Credit (EITC) is the 
program with the largest antipoverty effect3  while the Sup-
plementary Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is also criti-
cal because half of all SNAP participants were children and 
both participation and expenditures are strongly countercyclic-
al (participants receive their benefits on electronic benefit 
transfer cards that can be used only to purchase food).4 It is in 
fact impressing to record 44,7 millions participants to the 
SNAP in 2011, while they were 28,2 millions in 2008: in 2010 
the average household received monthly benefits worth $ 287. 
Amendments of market shortcomings cover a wide spectrum of 
programs, in Europe as well as in the U.S., and the Welfare State is 
an integral part of the fiscal policy, which can help to absorb the 
adverse consequences of major economic shocks, as the Great Re-
cession. The effectivness of amending market’s SINS depends cru-
cially on the timing and the extent of its countercyclical impact. 
2. The States of the European Welfare: patterns and empirical 
evidences 
The Welfare State is widespread in all the European countries and 
in this section we try to explain the reasons of its growing share of 
the GDP and ask whether there are limits or constraint to its in-
                                                     
3 Economic Report of the President (2012) p. 198. 
4 Ibi, p. 206. 
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crease. We can consider the Welfare State benefits as a social con-
sumption to be added to the private consumption of each house-
hold, even if in varying proportions: market provide for private 
goods while the Welfare State, or the Safety Net, provide for the 
“common goods”, the market’s SINS which the market mechanism 
is unable to deliver. While household private consumption is a 
function of disposable income (net of taxes and including govern-
ment benefits) and the aggregate private consumption function re-
sults as the amalgama of all the households, for the social con-
sumption the opposite holds. The Welfare State starts with an ag-
gregate (social welfare) function relating social consumption with 
GDP per-capita, on which tax receipts depend: the crucial differ-
ence with private consumption is that the social consumption for 
each household is the result of a political decision, concerning the 
level of public expenditures, their allocation by functions and the 
eligibility criteria which household have to comply with for access-
ing the available resources. We assume that the policy-maker de-
cides5, on the basis of citizens’ preferences and their political ap-
proval, how and which resources households are entitled to access, 
while respecting a “tight” or “soft” budget constraint, because the 
Government can borrow more easily than the households.  Con-
sumption per-capita and economic growth are related by a simulta-
neous and self-reinforcing mechanism which slows down as the 
variety of private and social needs are saturated. Therefore the first 
relationship we investigate is between GDP per-capita and social 
expenditures6 . If we consider, for a large sample of European 
countries, the relationship between the level of GDP per-capita and 
the share of social protection expenditures7 (as measured by Euros-
                                                     
5 We could assume a decision process related to a median voter (Meltzer 
and Richard, 1981). 
6 There is a vast literature on the determinant of government size, of 
which Social protecion expenditures are part of: Mueller provides an ex-
tensive review (see Muller (2003)). 
7 In the paper we use ther terms “expenditures and benefits” interchange-
bility: we point that all the empirical evidences is based on social protec-
tion benefits, because expenditures include salso administrative costs. 
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tat) in 2009 a well-defined quadratic pattern arises (figure 1): in 
2009, year of a heavy drop of the GDP, Denmark and France rec-
orded the highest share of social protection expenditures with re-
spect to the GDP (33%). 
Figure 1 - GDP per-capita and Social Protection Expenditures
Source: Author’s calculation on Eurostat  
However good the fitting, the relationship should be considered 
with caution, because it suggests a clear answer to the question 
about the existence of a maximum value of expenditures for the 
Welfare State, which relies however on too few small countries. 
We do not have a reliable comparison with the U.S., but if we try 
to add the available data, to figure out a reliable estimate, we 
record that even if public social spending is lower than in Europe, 
it is however rapidly increasing. The share of social expenditures 
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in the U.S. is, in fact, around half the share of the Netherland, a 
country with almost the same level of real GDP per-capita in 2009: 
however one has to note that in 2011 the  U.S. Federal Outlays for 
Health, Medicare, Income Security, Social Security represented 
about the 14,5% of the GDP, up from the 4,2% in 1966 (figure 2).  
Figure 2 - U.S. Federal Social Expenditures
Source: Author’s calculation from “the Economic Report of the President 2012”, 
table B-1, B-80 
It is a slow but steady increase which could bring the U.S. public 
spending closer and closer to the European levels in 10 to 20 years. 
It has been suggested that a better comparison between Europe and 
the U.S. should take into account also the employer-provided bene-
fits, like health insurance and pension, increasing substantially the 
share of social expenditures at a level comparable with the Euro-
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pean countries (Garfinkel, Rainwater and Smeedings, 2010): per-
haps this comparison is a bit stretched, but we can take this indica-
tion as suggestive of the underlying forces behind the growing 
Welfare State. 
A prominent theoretical and empirical interpretation suggests that 
the increase of welfare spending is a form of social insurance 
against economic shocks and the uncertainty coming from the 
world market, which is proxied by the degree of openess of the 
economies and the terms of trade (Rodrik, 1998). This interpreta-
tion fits clearly with the market’s SINS framework, however the 
relationship between openess and the social protection expendi-
tures, while holding for the past, becomes weaker for the 2000’s 
decade in Europe. We suggest that the pattern of new relationships 
between European countries – an halfway economic and political 
union – has also changed the relationship between openess, as a 
measure of uncertainty, and the demand for social protection. The 
tighter external constraint coming from a higher openess has been 
coupled, if not supplanted, by a “thight” or “soft” constraint on the 
public budget deficit.  
Therefore, we averaged over the decade the total public expendi-
ture, the social protection and the primary balance deficit or sur-
plus, as a share of the (averaged) GDP for all the European coun-
tries for which we could find comparable data (Eurostat is our 
main source). The social protection expenditures shows a close re-
lationship with the total general government expenditures (figure 
3): the relationship should not be considered as obvious, because 
social benefits are funded simultaneoulsy by the social contribution 
and general government contribution. In 2009 social contributions, 
more sensitive to economic fluctuations, represented 60,1% of the 
total receipts for the EA-17, with a significant balancing  (or 
throwing off balance) role by the government contributions 
(39,9%): the share of government contributions varies significantly 
across European countries, and therefore  the question arises 
whether the public budget constraint have an influence on the so-
cial protection expenditures. 
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Figure 3 - Social protection expenditures and total general 
 government expenditures
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
Indeed, the public budget constraint shows up in a positive rela-
tionship between the average primary balance and social protection 
expenditures: this means that, to some extent, the primary public 
budget balance constraint (net of of interests) is (soflty) binding 
with respect  to social protection expenditures (the sample is made 
of 28 European countries, excluding Norway, a clear outlier for 
many variables) (figure 4). As expected, there is a close relation-
ship between primary and total government balance, which shows 
that primary balance is, indeed, a major goal by the economic poli-
cy, and therefore a constraint on the government and social protec-
tion expenditures (figure 5): both cross-section relationships are 
however weak and we postpone to section 4 a more detailed time –
series analysis on a sample of major countries.  
15
Figure 4 - Primary Balance and Social protection expenditure
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat dataset 
We ask the question wether the primary balance is related to the 
GDP per-capita, which, as we have shown, is  a main economic va-
riable which explains the social protection expenditure: we show 
that the GDP per-capita in 2000 has a good predicting power on the 
average primary balance in the following decade, which implicitly 
also underlines the crucial role of economic growth in relaxing the 
primary balance constraint on the social protection expenditures  
(figure 6). This kind of relationship is however thorny because it 
implies a degree of self-reinforcing dynamic and therefore the need 
of a structural change in the pattern of social expenditures to modi-
fy a negative trajectory, i.e. a public deficit. 
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Figure 5 - Total and primary general government balance
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat dataset 
Figure 6 - Primary balance (average 2000-2009) and real GDP 
per capita in 2000
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
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3. Coping  with market’s SINS: a cross-section analysis  
While the primary budget constraint puts a lid on the level of ag-
gregate social consumption, the distribution of the resources avail-
able between the specific functions mirrors the efficiency in coping 
with the main goals of the Welfare State, namely market’s SINS, 
therefore promoting Stability of disposable income, reducing In-
equality, taking care of basic Needs, providing Safety and Security. 
According to the Eurostat statistical classification, the main func-
tions are conventionally grouped in the following areas: old-age 
and survivors, sickness/health care, disability, family/children, un-
employment, housing and social exclusion. To analyze the effi-
ciency of welfare spending, taking SINS as major goals, we can 
consider each function in relation with each goal, searching for 
possible relationships.  
With regard to pensions, we find, as reasonably expected, that a 
crude measure of demography - people 65 and over - explains 40% 
of the variability in Old-Age and Survivors benefits as a share of 
GDP in 2009 (45% if we consider only Old-Age): Ireland has the 
lowest share of population aged 65 and over, and correspondingly 
the lowest social protection expenditure as a share of GDP (figure 
7). In Italy the share of population over 65 is almost three times 
higher than Irland and the share of GDP for expenditures on Old-
Age and Survivors is almost two times higher. We should note that 
pensions are parts of the resources available to the “generational 
chain”, defined as the small community of 7-8 persons, made up of 
grandparents, parents and grandchildren which share a common 
pool of money and time resources. The relationship between 
pensions and consumption smoothing and Stability over the life-
cycle is confirmed for the individuals, and we suggest also the ge-
neratonal chain.  
Sickness and health care – the other major expenditure function - 
is, for the most part, a transfer in-kind, where the expenditures are 
mainly related with hospitals and drug costs with a direct relation-
ship with the goals of Need and Safety: as we  show below, the 
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function of “sickness and health care” has a significant impact on 
poverty reduction.  
Figure 7 - Social expenditure for Old-Age and Survivor and popu-
lation over 65
Source: Author’s calculations from Eurostat database 
The functions of housing and social exclusion can be related to 
some exogenous measure of social disorder like the crime rate or 
the rate of people in prison and the goals of Safety and Security. 
The crime rate is measured as the number of criminal offences re-
ported to the police, per 100 of population: despite the well-known 
problem of underreporting associated with this measure, we see a 
positive relationship between the crime rate and the share public 
spending for housing and social exclusion (figure 8). Higher crime 
rates call for a higher of expenditures for housing and social exclu-
19
sion and we could reasonably say that Sweden and UK spend more 
because the crime rate is higher. Over the last decade we record a 
sharp increase of violent crimes, (for which underreporting is a mi-
nor problem), in Sweden, England (with an impressive absolute 
number) and Wales, France, Italy, Netherland.  
Figure 8 - Crime rate and social exclusion expenditures
Source: Author’s calculation on Eurostat database 
Drug trafficking is the other crime, surely underreported, for which 
the number of offences has increased the most in Netherland, Swe-
den, England and Wales, while in Italy the number of offences is 
stable, but still the highest after Germany, where it is however de-
creasing. Increasing crime has entailed an increase of prisoners (the 
correlation between crime rates and imprisonment rate is weak, but 
highly sensitive to the inclusion of some small countries): we show 
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the existence of a possible non-linear relationship between social 
expenditure for housing and social exclusion, which – if confirmed 
– could be exploited to reduce crime (figure 9). The issue of crime 
increase begins to be carefully analyzed for its wide social and 
economic implications, exploring the role of demography, unem-
ployment, immigration, incarceration and abortion (Buonanno at 
al. 2010). 
Poverty reduction is a major welfare goal, related to Inequality and 
Needs, and the efficiency of welfare expenditure can be measured, 
comparing ex-ante poverty rates, before the social protection ex-
penditures, with ex-post poverty rates, after the social protection 
expenditures: taking the difference (before – after) as a dependent 
variable, we ask the question of which social expenditure function 
is most effective in poverty reduction (the poverty threshold is cal-
culated in each country as 60% of median disposable income).  
Figure 9 - Social expenditure for housing and social exclusion and 
prison population
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat dataset 
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Social expenditures for family/children arises as the function with 
the biggest impact on poverty reduction (figure 10): in fact if we 
can show a clear negative relationship between the percentage of 
families of 2 adults and 2 children at-risk-of-poverty and the social 
public expenditures for the function family/children as a percen-
tage of the in GDP in 2009 (figure 11 - we exclude Luxembourg as 
a large outlier). To expand the explanation power of this relation-
ship we run a stepwise regression (table 1) between the poverty re-
duction (before – after) and the percentage of social expenditures 
for the function of family and children (with respect to GDP) add-
ing the function of sickness/health care: the result is significant for 
both variables while the cross-section variability explained corres-
ponds to an R2 (adj) of 0,556 (we note that also the function of 
disability show a high correlation).  
Figure 10 - Family/children benefits and poverty reduction
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
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Figure 11 - Family of 2 adults and 2 children at risk of poverty 
and family/children benefits
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
We can therefore conclude that family and health care public ex-
penditures (and also disability, to a lighter extent) appear to be the 
most efficient social expenditures, in the sense of their being the 
more effective in poverty reduction. 
A wider scope for the Welfare State regards the Inequality arising 
from the presence of one or two earners in families with children, 
which calls for horizontal equity in fiscal policy and a higher de-
mand for labor with good wages. We already know that a higher 
share of social expenditure is associated with higher GDP per-
capita (figure 1) and, at same time, we can show a strong positive 
relationship between the GDP per-capita and the share of families 
with one parent full-time and one parent part-time (figure 12). 
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Table 1 - OLS regression
dependent variable: poverty reduction (before – after) 
indipendet variables: family/children and sickness/health care 
. sw reg beforeminusafter familychildren health, pr (0.05) 
               begin with full model 
p < 0.0500     for all terms in model 
      Source |  SS    df    MS      Number of obs  =     29 
-------------+------------------    F(  2,    26)  =  18.54 
       Model | .032    2   .016     Prob > F       =  0.000 
    Residual | .022   26   .000     R-squared      =  0.587 
-------------+------------------    Adj R-squared  =  0.556 
       Total | .055   28   .001     Root MSE       =  .0296 
-------------------------------------------------------------
beforeminu~c | Coef.  Std.Err.  t   P>|t| [95% Conf.Interval] 
-------------+-----------------------------------------------
familychil~c | 3.048   .649   4.69  0.000     1.713     4.383 
   healthdec |  .691   .314   2.20  0.037      .045     1.336 
       _cons | -.023   .023  -0.99  0.329     -.071      .024 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
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Figure 12 - GDP per-capita and % of families with children 
 Parents one full time, one part-time
Source: Author’s calculations on Oecd family database and Eurostat database 
This relationship can be interpreted as a mutual social agreement, 
between families with children and firms,  for more flexible work 
arrangements, in countries with higher level of GDP per-capita: 
implicitly it stresses the importance of the Stability of family in-
come, through monetary and in-kind transfers, as well as the cru-
cial importance of unemployment insurance against economic 
shocks and recessions. 
4. Coping with market’s SINS: the case of 7 major countries, from 
1996 to 2009 
In this section we focus on a single policy goal – Stability - from a 
different perspective, asking whether social protection benefits can 
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work as an automatic stabilizer, moving countercyclically in eco-
nomic recessions, and thus promoting economic recovery and indi-
rectly the other goals. We undertake this analysis selecting 7 major 
Eurpean countries for which we analyze the relationship between 
social protection expenditures and GDP variability over the period 
1995-2009: the countries selected, on the basis of their economic 
relevance or because they represent a different growth model, are 
Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Netherland, Sweden and UK.  A 
summary of the social expenditures for these countries is presented 
in table 2 (euro per-capita at constant prices) and table 3 (percen-
tage of GDP), selecting four years – 1995, 2000, 2008, 2009 – to 
get a first view of time dynamic, including the crisis: we also com-
pute the percentage of in-kind transfer.
If we look to the values per-capita some interesting points arise: 
the (constant) values of social expenditures increase for all coun-
tries between 1995 and 2009, but in 2009 the social expenditures 
increased in Germany, Spain France, Italy and Netherland, while 
decreased in Sweden and UK8. A common pattern is the increasing 
share of in-kind benefits with respect to the total benefits , for 
which the higher percentages has been reached in Sweden (45%) 
and U.K. (40,5%), while the lowest has been hitted in Italy (26,9%) 
and Spain (34,4%). At the same time it crucial to note the differ-
ences of the total social protection benefits as a percentage of GDP 
(2009), ranging from a low of 28,2% in U.K. and 28,4% in Italy to 
a high of 31,6% in France and 31,5% in Sweden: a range which 
becomes much wider if we consider the percentage of in-kind 
transfer, from a low of 7,6% in Italy and 8,4% in Spain to a high of 
11,7% in Netherland and 14,2% in Sweden. These differences of 
the percentage of GDP translate in much wider differences in total 
benefits per-capita, from a low of 4.316 euro in Spain and 5.813 
euro in Italy (at constant 2000 prices) to a high of 8.641 in Nether-
land and 8.548 in Sweden.  
                                                     
8 There is a break for the UK data, because of a riclassification by the De-
partment of Work and Pensions as from 2007: this change should not 
have influenced the change between 2008 an 2009.  
26
Ta
bl
e 
2 
- S
oc
ia
l p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
be
ne
fit
s (
th
ou
sa
nd
s e
ur
o 
pe
r i
nh
ab
ita
nt
)
Eu
ro
 p
er
 in
ha
bi
ta
nt
 (a
t c
on
st
an
t 2
00
0 
pr
ic
es
) 
To
ta
l 
C
as
h
In
 k
in
d 
%
 in
 k
in
d 
G
EO
/T
IM
E 
19
95
 
20
00
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
19
95
 
20
00
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
19
95
 
20
00
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
19
95
 
20
00
 
20
08
20
09
G
er
m
an
y 
 
6.
68
9 
7.
11
2 
7.
21
5 
7.
77
1 
4.
55
3
4.
86
6
4.
75
5
4.
99
0
2.
13
7
2.
24
7
2.
46
0
2.
78
1 
31
,9
 
31
,6
 
34
,1
35
,8
Sp
ai
n
2.
77
9 
3.
05
7 
3.
96
8 
4.
31
6 
2.
00
7
2.
05
1
2.
53
8
2.
83
1
77
2
1.
00
6
1.
43
0
1.
48
5 
27
,8
 
32
,9
 
36
,0
34
,4
Fr
an
ce
 
6.
09
4 
6.
56
8 
7.
59
4 
7.
95
4 
4.
03
9
4.
36
0
4.
93
4
5.
18
6
2.
05
5
2.
20
8
2.
66
0
2.
76
8 
33
,7
 
33
,6
 
35
,0
34
,8
Ita
ly
 
4.
02
0 
4.
97
6 
5.
62
6 
5.
81
3 
3.
12
5
3.
76
5
4.
08
6
4.
25
0
89
5
1.
21
1
1.
54
0
1.
56
4 
22
,3
 
24
,3
 
27
,4
26
,9
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
6.
75
0 
6.
48
8 
8.
16
4 
8.
64
1 
4.
84
6
4.
52
5
4.
97
3
5.
24
1
1.
90
4
1.
96
3
3.
19
1
3.
40
1 
28
,2
 
30
,3
 
39
,1
39
,4
Sw
ed
en
7.
64
9 
8.
85
7 
9.
20
8 
8.
54
8 
4.
60
9
5.
20
2
5.
00
7
4.
70
1
3.
04
0
3.
65
5
4.
20
1
3.
84
8 
39
,7
 
41
,3
 
45
,6
45
,0
U
.K
. 
4.
47
8 
6.
93
2 
6.
18
6 
5.
86
7 
2.
96
0
4.
61
8
3.
69
0
3.
49
1
1.
51
8
2.
31
4
2.
49
6
2.
37
6 
33
,9
 
33
,4
 
40
,3
40
,5
So
ur
ce
: A
ut
ho
r’
s c
al
cu
la
tio
n 
fr
om
 E
ur
os
ta
t d
at
ab
as
e 
27
Ta
bl
e 
3 
- S
oc
ia
l p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
be
ne
fit
s (
 %
G
D
P)
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f G
D
P 
To
ta
l 
C
as
h 
In
ki
nd
 
G
EO
/T
IM
E
19
95
20
00
20
08
20
09
19
95
20
00
20
08
20
09
19
95
20
00
20
08
20
09
G
er
m
an
y 
27
,2
28
,6
26
,9
 
30
,1
18
,5
19
,5
17
,7
19
,3
8,
7
9,
0
9,
2
10
,8
 
Sp
ai
n 
20
,9
19
,5
21
,6
 
24
,5
15
,1
13
,1
13
,8
16
,1
5,
8
6,
4
7,
8
8,
4 
Fr
an
ce
 
28
,7
27
,7
29
,5
 
31
,6
19
,0
18
,4
19
,2
20
,6
9,
7
9,
3
10
,3
11
,0
 
Ita
ly
23
,2
23
,8
26
,5
 
28
,4
18
,1
18
,0
19
,2
20
,8
5,
2
5,
8
7,
3
7,
6 
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
28
,9
24
,7
26
,9
 
29
,7
20
,8
17
,2
16
,4
18
,0
8,
2
7,
5
10
,5
11
,7
 
Sw
ed
en
 
33
,1
29
,3
28
,9
 
31
,5
19
,9
17
,2
15
,7
17
,3
13
,1
12
,1
13
,2
14
,2
 
U
.K
. 
26
,4
25
,5
25
,3
 
28
,2
17
,5
17
,0
15
,1
16
,8
9,
0
8,
5
10
,2
11
,4
 
So
ur
ce
: A
ut
ho
r’
s c
al
cu
la
tio
n 
fr
om
 E
ur
os
ta
t  
28
The first question which we now address is the dynamic of social 
protection benefits with respect to GDP growth and fluctuation, to 
assess whether social protection benefits are procyclical or coun-
tercyclical: to obtain a simple, but complete, understanding we 
computed the simple correlation coefficient of the annual rate of 
change of social protection benefits per-capita for each function 
and the annual rate of change of the GDP per-capita, over the pe-
riod 1996-2009. Quite different patterns emerge, across the coun-
tries and the functions (table 4). The unemployment insurance is 
the only function for which a countercyclical behavior with nega-
tive correlation, marked by the Great Recession, arises for all the 
countries: the value of the coefficient is however low for France 
and Sweden. France and Germany are the only two countries 
showing a countercyclical behavior for all the social protection 
functions, while Sweden and UK are procyclical for almost all the 
social protection functions (excluding unemployment). The pattern 
for each function varies markedly across the countries: sickness 
and health care is countercyclical in Germany (-0,5475) and pro-
cyclical in Sweden (0,6545) and UK (0,6941). Family and children 
benefits are (mildly) countercyclical in France (-0,3872) procyclic-
al in Sweden (0,44486) and UK (0,5817). In Italy, apart from un-
employment, disability is the only function which is (mildly) coun-
tercyciclical (-0,3534). Within the specific funtions of each coun-
tries comovents tend to prevail, with a wide range of correlations. 
The correlation of the total social protection expenditures with the 
GDP per-capita cannot be taken as such, because of the distorsion 
due to the inclusion of social protection expenditures in the GDP: 
the correlation with the rate of change mitigate but do not correct a 
posssible bias, given the high percentage of social protection ex-
penditures in the GDP. 
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A straightforward procedure is to subtract the social protection ex-
penditures from the GDP per-capita9, comparing the result with the 
original data. We make this correction for Sweden (figure 13) and 
Germany (figure 14), whose patterns are representative: the dy-
namic is similar to the ones without correction, but with better fit-
ting values. 
Figure 13 – Sweden – social benefits and GDP (1996-2009)
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
                                                     
9 We subtract the social protection benefits per-capita (constant 2000 
prices) from the GDP per capita (constant 2005 prices) and then we ana-
lyze the relationship between these two new aggregates. There are two 
implicit assumptions: first, the two aggregates can be considered separa-
ble, while a wider theoretical model should allow for some form of com-
plementarity or substitutability, and second, the two series (source Euros-
tat), while being both at constant prices, have two different references 
years, which methodologically should have only a slight effect on the cal-
culation of the rate of change, over short periods. 
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Figure 14 - Germany – social benefits and GDP (1996-2009)
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
We also run a regression, pooling the data corrected for Germany 
plus France (28 annual observations), with and without fixed effect 
(1996-2009): the estimates are similar and with the expected coun-
tercyclical sign in both cases (table 5 – only for fixed effect). The 
estimates (fixed effect) are still significant if we exclude the years 
2008-2009, but enlarge the dataset to Germany, France, Sweden 
and UK (48 annual observations): however the R2 decreases and 
the coefficient on the GDP increase, still retaining the negative 
countercyclical sign (table 6). 
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Table 5 - Social protection expenditures (SPE) and GDP per-
capita (less SPE) 
 Germany and France (Fixed Effect) 
 Rates of annual change 1996-2009
FE panel regression 
Fixed-effects (within) regression  Number of obs      =     28 
Group variable: country            Number of groups   =      2 
R-sq:  within  = 0.550             Obs per group: min =     14 
       between = 1.000                            avg =   14.0 
       overall = 0.545                            max =     14 
                                   F(1,25)            =  30.67 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.062             Prob > F           =  0.000 
--------------------------------------------------------------
-
      varspe | Coef.  Std.Err.  t   P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+------------------------------------------------
-
varpilmeno~e | -.513   .092   -5.54  0.000   -.703      -.322 
       _cons | 1.987   .291    6.82  0.000   1.387      2.587 
-------------+------------------------------------------------
-
     sigma_u |  .446 
     sigma_e | 1.476 
         rho |  .083  (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
--------------------------------------------------------------
F test that all u_i=0: F(1, 25)= 1.28        Prob > F = 0.2694 
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Table 6 -  Social protection expenditures (SPE) and GDP  
 per-capita (less SPE) 
 Germany, France, Sweden, UK (Fixed Effect) 
 Rates of annual change 1996-2007
FE panel regression 
. xtreg varspe varpilmenospe if country==France | 
country==Germany|country==Sweden |country==UK, fe 
Fixed-effects (within) regression  Number of obs      =    48 
Group variable: country            Number of groups   =     4 
R-sq:  within  = 0.451             Obs per group: min =    12 
       between = 0.206                            avg =  12.0 
       overall = 0.339                            max =    12 
                                   F(1,43)            = 35.36 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.299            Prob > F           = 0.000 
--------------------------------------------------------------
      varspe |  Coef. Std.Err.  t   P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+-------------- --------------------------------- 
varpilmeno~e | -1.566  .263  -5.95  0.000    -2.097   -1.035 
       _cons |  5.670  .811   6.99  0.000     4.033    7.306 
-------------+------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u | 2.089 
     sigma_e | 3.576 
         rho |  .254   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
--------------------------------------------------------------
F test that all u_i=0: F(3, 43) =  3.73      Prob > F = 0.0181 
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However, the Fixed Effect procedure neutralize the possibility to 
identify the specific pattern of each country, selecting subgroups. 
Indeed, it is instead useful to group the countries as follows: 
a) Germany and Spain show a significant countercyclical rela-
tionship: in 2009 the percentage of general government  con-
tributions to total receipts for social protection is 37% in Ger-
many and 44,5% in Spain (the share of social contributions be-
ing the complement to 100). 
b) France and Netherland show a weaker countercyclical relation-
ship: the percentage of general government contribution to to-
tal receipts is 35,4% in France and 34,6% in Netherland. 
c) Italy does not show any detectable pattern, with a percentage 
of general government contribution to total receipts of 45,4% 
d) Sweden and United Kingdom show a countercyclical pattern 
from 1996 to 2007, while from 2007 to 2009 the pattern is pro-
cyclical: the percentage of general government contributions to 
totale receipts is 54% in Sweden and 56,1% in UK.
We can ask which is the better economic policy, countercyclical 
rather procyclical, in terms of the economic growth and govern-
ment balances following the sharp drop in social spending in 2009, 
with the advantage of knowing ex-post the economic performances 
(table 7). The outcomes are mixed because: 
a) Germany improves growth and public balances while Spain 
worsens both significantly. 
b) France and Netherland show weaker improvements of growth 
and public balances. 
c) Italy improves its primary balance and deficit, but growth does 
not recover. 
d) Sweden show a significant recovery and a surplus of primary 
and total government balance while UK  show a much worse 
performance. 
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Sweden (procyclical) seems to record the best results during the 
mild recovery of 2010-2011, together with Germany (countercyc-
lical): France and Netherland show improving, but slower perfor-
mances, while Spain (countercyclical) and even more UK (cyclic-
al) record the worst performances among the selected European 
countries.  No clear pattern arises, except that best performing 
countries recorded the highest social protection expenditure per-
capita in 2009, while the worst – Spain, Italy and UK – recorded 
the lowest.
The procyclical behavior for Sweden and UK during the Great Cri-
sis leaves open the question of explaining the pattern of benefits 
reductions. To understand it we consider the years 2008 and 2009 
for the selected countries and the main social protection functions.  
We can check that in Sweden and UK the procyclical decrease in 
2009 regards all the social functions with the exception of the un-
employment benefits (table 8): for Sweden we should however 
note that in 2009 the level of real social protection benefits per-
capita was among the highest in Europe, despite the GDP decrease. 
This suggests that a high level of social protection benefits per-
capita can give political leeway during a recession, being itself an 
policy instrument for budget adjusment. It is in the UK that the 
procyclical behavior is really at variance, because the social protec-
tion benefits are instead relatively low: both countries have in 
common a higher share of generale government contributions, 52% 
in Sweden and 49% in UK. In both countries the Great Recession 
is the cause of a government deficit in 2009: -0,7% in Sweden and 
a much wider -11,5% in UK – prompting a policy of public ex-
penditure reduction. In the case of Sweden we have a peculiar 
countercyclical movement of social public expenditure in the op-
posite direction of the general government budget deficit or surplus 
(figure 15), which has been officiallly implemented as a fiscal pol-
icy, targeting 1% percent of public budget surplus over the busi-
ness cycle (OECD, 2008): the general budget balance is therefore a 
“tight” constraint, with a margin of fluctuation for the social pro-
tection expenditures, around the 30% of GDP, to abide by this rule.  
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Figure 15 - Social protection benefits and and total government bal-
ance - Sweden 1965-2009
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
In the case of the UK, the budget deficit was simply too high to man-
age a similar adjustment, given the low starting level of social pro-
tection expenditures. The pattern for France is quite similar to that of 
Sweden, the main difference being that primary budget seems to be 
the target and the binding constraint, while for Sweden it is the total 
budget (figure 16). Choosing total rather primary constraint seems to 
be the crucial question in defining the size of the welfare state, given 
the GDP per-capita, which in turn depends on the size of debt servic-
ing, the public debt/GDP ratio and the share of payments to non-
residents.
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Figure 16 - France social protection benefits and total government 
balance
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
Cyclicality of the social protection benefits to GDP ratio means an 
adequate share of discretionary spending, which is very difficult to 
achieve with regard to the entitlement to cash transfers, while it 
seems more plausible that the central (or local) government can tem-
porary “ration” supply and spending of in-kind transfer, like health 
care supply. This hypothesis is partly confirmed by a positive cross-
section relationship between the level of social protection benefits, as 
share of GDP, and the share of in-kind transfers (figure 17), as well 
by the steady increase over the time of in-kind transfers for the ma-
jority of European countries. The shift toward in-kind transfers al-
lows a better targeting of the needs and the social cost of “paternal-
ism” can be balanced by a better chance of political approval: at the 
same time in-kind transfers have the advantage of allowing a margin 
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of temporary discretionary expenditures over the business cycle or 
during serious economic crises. Another way to limit the access to 
social protection benefits is to make them conditional on income le-
vels, as a part of fiscal policy with income progressivity, without ne-
cessary making them conditional on a means-testing.  
Figure 17 - Social protection benefits and % in-kind
Source: Author’s calculation from Eurostat database 
Conclusions
We suggest that we can better understand the European Welfare 
State as the primary institution necessary to cope with the unavoida-
ble shortcomings of the market mechanism, which we relate to issues 
of stability, inequality, needs and safety, for which we use the 
acronym market’s SINS. 
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We show the existence of a positive (perhaps quadratic) relationship 
between the social protection benefits, as a share of GDP, and the 
GDP per-capita: we argue that to understand the increasing aggregate 
demand of social protection we need to disaggregate it with respect 
to the main goals and functions.  Pensions  and health care are clearly 
related to the achievement of Stability and Need, while the benefits 
for housing and social exclusion are related to the goal of Safety and 
Security. Need and extreme Inequality, measured through poverty 
reduction, are clearly related to the benefits for the functions of fami-
ly and children, sickness and health care, disability. We show the 
close relationship between social benefits and public balance, total 
and primary, and we discriminate the countercyclical or procyclical 
behavior for a sample of 7 major European countries. European Wel-
fare State shows different patterns in the process of public budget ad-
justment: we discuss the case of Sweden, a country with very good 
economic performances and a procyclical behavior allowed by the 
highest social protection benefit per-capita: the political leeway of 
high social protection expenditure seems to be an overlooked instru-
ment of stabilization. Sweden officially targets a total balance sur-
plus of 1%, France seems to target, implicitly, the primary balance. 
Sweden and Germany rebounded 7-8% compounded growth in 2010 
and 2011 , given a high level of social spending; France and Nether-
land rebounded more than 2% also with the same high level of 
spending; Spain, Italy and UK, with a low level of social spending, 
rebounded much less, between 0 and 2%, with only a slight im-
provement in total public balance.  This pattern is confirmed in the 
first semester of 2012: Sweden and Germany record a significant 
GDP growth, France and Netherland are flat or with a slight increase, 
while Spain, Italy and UK are technically in recession, with the third 
straight quarter of GDP decrease. The role of economic growth in 
fostering an improvement of primary balances is quite clear, espe-
cially in Spain, Italy and UK: indeed we show that the GDP per-
capita in 2000 is a strong predictor  of the average primary balance in 
the period 2000-2009. We show a positive relationship between the 
level of social protection benefits and the percentage of in-kind bene-
fits on total benefits: this pattern has many implications. It underlines 
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a more comprehensive approach of the Welfare State, which includes 
the greater political flexibility of in-kind benefits, and the chance of 
smooth and quick “rationing” schemes when the budget balance is in 
deficit.
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